LANGUAGE IN CONTEXT

Robin Lakoff

University of California, Berkeley

Traditional transformational grammar attempts to define the conditions on the applicability of grammatical rules on the basis of superficial syntactic environment alone. This paper discusses a number of examples in several languages that show that such a goal is unattainable—that, in order to predict correctly the applicability of many rules, one must be able to refer to assumptions about the social context of an utterance, as well as to other implicit assumptions made by the participants in a discourse.*

When studying exotic languages, the speaker of English often runs into odd facts. As if the syntactic, lexical, and morphological peculiarities with which other people's languages are unfortunately replete were not enough to confound the English speaker, he encounters still odder details—things which, as far as he can see, have no analogs in English at all. It is certainly bad enough to encounter case languages, or languages with complex and synthetic tense systems, or absolute constructions, or six words for 'snow'; but at least these are analogous to things that occur in English. But what about certain still stranger phenomena? How does the native speaker ever learn these weird distinctions? How can he ever remember to make them, in the course of ordinary conversation? Doesn't he inevitably (though accidentally) offend everyone he encounters, or incessantly stamp himself as a boob?

The problems I am referring to will of course be immediately recognizable to anyone who has done any reading about almost any language that is not English —that is, I should think, any linguist. I refer to phenomena such as the following:

(i) Particles, like *doch* in German, or *ge* in Classical Greek, or *zo* in Japanese. How do you know when to use them? And how do you know when NOT to? Are they inserted in sentences randomly? Since these particles do not add to the 'information content' conveyed by the sentence, but rather relate this information content to the feelings the speaker has about it, or else suggest the feelings of the speaker toward the situation of the speech act, it is sometimes rather cavalierly stated that they are 'meaningless'. If this were really true, it would of course be impossible to misuse them. But we all know that there is nothing easier for the non-native speaker.

(ii) Honorifics. Asian languages, Japanese in particular, are infamous for containing these. Using them in the wrong situation will, one is assured, result in instantaneous ostracism. But how do you know when the situation is wrong? The non-native speaker apparently never sorts it out. Can the native speaker (who is linguistically naïve) be expected to do any better?

(iii) Many languages have endings on verbs, or special forms related to the

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verbal system, that are used to suggest that the speaker himself doesn't take responsibility for a reported claim, or that he does—that he is hesitant about a claim he is making or confident of its veracity. How can a speaker keep track of these mysterious concepts? Are speakers of other languages conceivably THAT MUCH smarter than we are? Then why don't THEY have a man on the moon?

The purpose of this paper is to explore these questions. I will not really attempt to answer the question, 'How do they do it?'—we don't know how people do even the simplest and most obvious linguistic operations. But what I will show is that these phenomena also occur in English. It is often not superficially obvious that we are dealing, in English, with phenomena analogous to politeness or hesitance markers in other languages; there are often no special separate readily identifiable morphological devices. Rather, these distinctions are expressed by forms used elsewhere for other purposes. Therefore it is easy to imagine that they are not present at all. But I hope to show that the reverse is true; and further, that if the presence and uses of these forms are recognized, several of the most difficult problems confronting such diverse areas as theoretical linguistics and the teaching of second languages will be solvable. Thus I am in effect making two claims, the first of theoretical, the other of practical, interest:

(a) Contextually-linked linguistic phenomena are probably identifiable, to one extent or another, in all the languages of the world. But one language may have special markers for some or many of these possibilities, while another language may utilize forms it uses elsewhere for other purposes. One language may require that these markers be present, while another may consider them optional, or to be used only in case special classification is desired, or for special stylistic effects. (As we shall see later in this paper, Japanese is apparently a representative of the first class of languages, English of the second. Hence, as many speakers of Japanese have said to me, English sounds 'harsh' or 'impolite' to them; while to the speaker of English, Japanese often gives the effect of being unbelievably subtle, making inordinately many unnecessary distinctions.) But we should ask, not only whether a language is one type or the other or a mixture of both, but also whether this fact about a language is related to any other facts, deep or superficial, about its structure. Since questions of this sort have not been studied in any disciplined way heretofore, nothing is known at present. The answers, if ever found, would be of interest in studies of the lexicon, the forms of logical structure, the identification of linguistically relevant types of presupposition, and many other areas with which linguistic theorists are at present concerned.

(b) If one is to teach second-language use successfully—so that a non-native speaker can use the language he is learning in a way reminiscent of a native speaker, rather than a robot—then the situations in which forms of this type are usable in a given language must be identified. It is obviously useless to try to list or pinpoint the superficial syntactic configurations where they are correctly used; examples will be given later in the paper that illustrate the problem. We must then identify the means by which the second language makes these distinctions, and pair the two, although in terms of superficial syntax, the two languages will appear to have little in common.

We may distinguish certain aspects of context from others. Some have universal linguistic relevance; others may be linguistically relevant under certain conversational situations but not others, or for certain cultures but not others; and still others may never be linguistically relevant as far as we know. So it is normally true in all languages and all situations that one must somehow make clear the type of speech act involved: are you asking a question, making a statement, or giving an order? Ambiguities in this regard are generally not tolerated.[1] Some languages require that you know more about the speech situation than this. English sometimes requires overt notice as to whether the speaker believes a past-time event is relevant to the present, by the use of the perfect tense rather than the preterit. Other languages require that there be overt expression of the identity of speaker and/or addressee: what are their respective social positions? And, related to this, of course, what are their respective ages and sex? English only sometimes requires that these be recognized overtly; other languages, such as Japanese, require it much more often. But it is hard to think of a language that requires one special overt marker if the speaker has blue eyes, and a different one if the speaker has brown eyes. This is contextual information, as real and available to the speakers of a language for the purpose of making distinctions as are differentiation of age and sex; yet only the latter two often occur as linguistically significant contextual information.

In any case, I trust that, by the end of this discussion, it will be perfectly clear that there are areas of linguistic competence that cannot be described in any theory that does not allow an integration of information about the context in which the discourse takes place—sometimes erroneously referred to as 'real-world' as opposed to 'linguistically relevant' situation—and the purely linguistically relevant information the sentence seeks to convey: superficial syntax, choice of lexical items, and semantics aside from contextually-relevant meaning elements.

I shall try to substantiate some of the claims I have been making by looking at examples.

We all know, or at least know of, languages that employ honorifics as essential elements in sentences. Sometimes they occur with personal names, and in these cases it is fairly easy to see what is going on: one usually assumes that the speaker either actually is lower in status than the addressee, or is speaking as if he were. In the latter case, which is perhaps the more usual in conversational situations, it is assumed that this linguistic abasement occurs for reasons of politeness. But an important question is usually glossed over: why is it polite for the speaker to suggest that the addressee surpasses him in status? In some languages we find honorifics related to non-human items, to show that the speaker considers them of importance in one way or another. How is this related to any notion of polite-

[1] Gordon & Lakoff 1971 discuss a number of interesting cases where, if one looks only at superficial syntactic configurations, apparent ambiguities of this type do in fact exist: e.g., *It's stuffy in here*, most normally a declarative statement, may, under specific, contextually determined conditions, be interpretable as an imperative, equivalent to *Please open the window*. As they show, this does not indicate that such sentences really are ambiguous between the two interpretations: it indicates rather that context must play a role in the interpretation of sentences.

ness, which is a concept involving behavior between human beings? Another problem is that many languages apparently have two kinds of honorifics. One is the kind I have just mentioned. But going hand in hand with this is the use of forms that humble or debase the speaker himself, or things connected with him. Translated into English, this often has ludicrous results, e.g. 'Honorable Mr. Snarf have some of my humble apple pie?' This sort of translation is ludicrous for several reasons, but perhaps principally because, by translating the honorific and dis-honorific, if I may use that term, with overt adjectives, the sense of the sentence has been palpably altered. In the original language, the sense of superiority or inferiority conveyed by the honorifics is presupposed, or implicit. The use of adjectives like *honorable* and *humble* makes these concepts explicit. So what had been a tacit suggestion, in effect, is now made overt. The English translations do not, I think, allow the monolingual speaker of English to get any sense of how a speaker of Japanese feels when he is addressed with *-san*. But I believe there are locutions in English whose force comes close to that of the true honorific, because the differentiation in status they establish is implicit rather than overt. These forms are also used for the sake of politeness (as adjectives like *humble* and *honorable* never are).

I said earlier that these contextually-linked forms had not been recognized in English partly because the forms utilized for this purpose had other, more obvious uses. English modals are a case in point. Certain uses of the modal *must* are parallel to the use in other languages of special honorific forms:

(1) You must have some of this cake.
(2) You should have some of this cake.
(3) You may have some of this cake.

Let us assume, for the purpose of analysing these sentences, a special social situation: a party, at which the hostess is offering the guests a cake that she baked herself or at least selected herself, and which she therefore takes responsibility for. In such a social context, 1 is the most polite of these forms, approaching in its range of appropriateness that of a true honorific in languages that have such forms. Further, although in theory 2 should be more 'polite' than 1, in actual use it is not: in the situation established above, the use of 2 would be rude, while 1 would be polite. And 3, which might at first seem the most polite form, actually is the least. Why is this?

Finding the answer lies partly in determining what constitutes politeness, and of course, its opposite, rudeness. If we can define these notions, then the uses of these modals will be seen to be governed by the same assumptions of politeness as govern the use of honorifics; once the principle is understood, it can be transferred from language to language. What we are dealing with here is something extralinguistic—the way in which individuals relate to one another—that directly affects the use of language. We must understand something about non-linguistic social interaction before we can see the generalization that is in effect regulating the use of sentences like 1–3, along with the use of affixes like *-san* and *o-* in Japanese.

It is obvious, of course, that what passes for politeness in one culture will appear to a member of another culture as slavishness or boorishness. We are all familiar with examples of this. Then how can we talk about universal conditions governing the use of honorifics and other politeness markers? I think we can assume that there is a universal definition of what constitutes linguistic politeness: part of this involves the speaker's acting as though his status were lower than that of the addressee. What may differ from language to language, or culture to culture—or from subculture to subculture within a language—is the question of WHEN it is polite to be polite, to what extent, and how it is shown in terms of superficial linguistic behavior.[2] Although a speaker may know the universal definition of politeness, he may apply it at the wrong time or in the wrong way if he attempts to transfer the uses of his own language directly into another; hence the ludicrousness that results from taking a polite concept implicit in one language and making it explicit. If, in a given language, one's own possessions are customarily followed by a marker of humility (a situation which perhaps can be symbolized by 4 below), it does not follow that 5, in which what is implicit in the marker in 4 is made explicit, is a reasonable English translation of 4. In fact, as has already been noted, the effect of such bogus translations is generally laughable, and rightly so:

(4) Have some of this cake-*yecch*.

(5) Have some of this revolting cake.

My claim is that a sentence like 1 is a much closer translation of 4 than 5 is, although 5 stays closer to the superficial syntax of the original language. The task of the translator then is compounded: he must translate contextual and societal concepts—contexts that are, strictly speaking, extralinguistic—in addition to merely translating words and ideas and endings.

Let me try to be more specific in identifying 1, but not 2 or 3, as an honorific form in an extended sense of the term. (I will define HONORIFIC as a form used to convey the idea that the speaker is being polite to the hearer.) At first it seems contradictory to say that a sentence containing *must* is more polite than one using *should* or *may*. Going by the ordinary uses of the modals, *must* imposes an obligation, while *should* merely gives advice that may be disregarded, and *may* allows someone to do something he already wanted to do. Surely it should be more polite to give someone advice, or to let someone do as he wishes, than to impose an unavoidable obligation upon him.

Normally this is true, but under special conditions the reverse is the case, and this is the situation in 1–3. If we want to understand why these modals work as they do here, we must ask: under what real-world conditions is it appropriate to use each of these modals? So, for example, if the use of *must* expresses the imposition upon its superficial subject of an obligation (whether by the speaker or by

[2] So, for example, if an officer in the Army (a subculture with special status-related rules) gives a command to a private, he will not normally preface his command with *please*. Although in most English-speaking groups the use of *please* prefaced to an imperative is a mark of politeness, to use *please* in this situation will be interpretable as sarcastic. Again, in some cultures it is considered polite to refuse an invitation several times before one is conventionally 'prevailed upon' to accept: if a speaker from such a culture finds himself in one where it is considered polite to accept invitations at once with thanks, confusion and worse will inevitably ensue, with each party impressing the other as unbelievably boorish or stupid.

someone else, with the speaker merely reporting the fact), under what conditions in the real world is it necessary to impose an obligation? The answer is simple: it must be the case that the person on whom the obligation rests would not do what he is instructed unless he were obliged to do it. That is, the assumption is that performing the act is distasteful, requiring coercion of the superficial subject.

Now in a normal situation it is not polite to coerce anyone, since, among other things, such action reminds him that you are his superior in power. Thus *must* is normally used for politeness only when it is a second-hand report that an obligation is imposed, on the addressee or on a third person, by someone other than the speaker. In this situation, the speaker is not using *must* as a means of coercion through his greater power or prestige; but he is so doing when *must* reflects the speaker's own imposition of an obligation. In a sentence like 1, the most natural assumption is that the speaker himself is imposing an obligation on the hearer. Then why is 1 a polite offer? Why does one not take umbrage when such a sentence is spoken to one, as a dinner guest, by one's hostess? We seem to be faced with an utterance that is, in a special sense, 'ambiguous'. This is, of course, no normal type of ambiguity, since it cannot be disambiguated by linguistic context or by paraphrase. Rather, the addressee, hearing a sentence like 1, disambiguates it in terms of the social situation in which he is exposed to it.

Let me be more precise. Suppose you overhear the sentence *Visiting relatives can be a nuisance* in isolation. You have no way of knowing whether the speaker is talking about relatives who visit, or the act of visiting one's relatives. But if the hearer has also heard prior discourse, and if, for example, this discourse was concerned with a discussion of the properties of relatives, and when relatives were a nuisance, the hearer is able to disambiguate the sentence by linguistic means.

Now we know that the modal *must* is actually an amalgam of several meanings, all related but differentiable. (I will confine my discussion to the root sense of *must*, for obvious reasons.) As suggested above, these related meanings are:

(a) The speaker is higher in rank than the superficial subject of *must*, in sent. 1 identical with the addressee. As such the former can impose an obligation on the latter.

(b) The thing the addressee is told to do is distasteful to him: he must be compelled to do it against his will.

(c) Something untoward will happen to the addressee if he does not carry out the instruction.[3]

Any of these assumptions might be primary in a given instance. In non-polite

[3] It seems reasonable to believe that, of the three assumptions comprising the meaning of *must*, (a) and (c) are first-order presuppositions, and (b) second-order. The reason for making this claim is that (a) and (c) can be questioned, as is typical of first-order presuppositions, while (b) cannot, as the following examples show. In reply, e. g., *You must take out the garbage!*, the respondent might retort, under the appropriate circumstances, with *You can't make me!* or *Who's gonna make me?* (which contradict (a), and are equivalent to 'You don't have the authority'), or with *So what if I don't?* (which contradicts (c), and is equivalent to 'If I don't do it, I won't suffer.') But he cannot reply with **I want to anyhow!* (which would be a contradiction of (b) and equivalent to 'I am not being made to do it against my will.'

situations, normally (a) is paramount in sentences like 6, and (c) in cases like 7; it seems to depend on context.

(6) You must clean the latrine, Private Zotz: this is the Army, and I'm your sergeant.

(7) You must take this medicine, Mr. President, or you will never get over making those awkward gestures.

Theoretically, then, a sentence like 1 should be triply ambiguous, and two of the ambiguities should be rude. In fact, if taken out of context, such a sentence would be just as mysterious to the hearer as *Visiting relatives can be a nuisance.* But just as with the latter, 1 is swiftly disambiguated if one is aware of the context. For 1, it is extralinguistic context: one knows one is being addressed by the hostess proffering her cake, and one accordingly decides on meaning (b). (Of course, if 1 were spoken by a member of the Mafia whose wife had baked the cake, the range of possible choices of meaning might be wider.)

Why are *should* and *may* less polite in this context? In the case of these modals, we are making rather different assumptions about the willingness of the subject to perform the act, and it is here, I think, that the non-politeness lies. With *should*, there is normally no assumption that the action is to be performed against the subject's will: the speaker is making a suggestion to the addressee to do something that might not have occurred to him, but there is no hint that he would be averse to it, or would have to be compelled to do it. In fact, the use of *should* indicates that the speaker is not in a position to use duress to secure compliance: he can suggest but not coerce. In non-polite use, then, *should* is more polite than *must* since the speaker is not suggesting his status is such that he can coerce the addressee. But this implies that he NEED NOT coerce the addressee, and for this reason the 'humbling' force of *must* is absent. But *should* by itself is not really a politeness marker: it does not humble the speaker, but merely makes him the equal of the addressee. So the use of *should* in the dinner party situation is not particularly polite: in fact, it is rather rude, since the hostess is suggesting that it would be better for the addressee if he had some cake—that is, that the cake is too good to miss. From this assumption, the implication follows that the hostess' offering is a good thing—contrary, as we have seen, to the rules of politeness. As a further example of this, consider what happens if the hostess should OVERTLY make the same suggestion. The same sense of impropriety ensues from 8 as from 2:

(8) Have some of this delicious cake.

But if another guest is offering the cake, both 2 and 8 are perfectly appropriate and usual, since the guest is not praising his own property. This shows that implicit and explicit assumptions—in this case, of the value of one's own possessions—work the same way in determining appropriateness, and both work the same way as honorifics in other languages:

(9) Have some of this '*o*-cake'.[4]

(10) Have some of my friend's '*o*-cake'.

[4] According to Tazuko Uyeno, although not every Japanese noun may receive the *o*-honorific prefix, those that can behave as suggested in the text. E.g., the word *taku* 'house' will take the prefix *o*- when it refers to the home of someone other than the speaker and will

(11) You should have some of her cake.
(12) Have some of her delicious cake.

Finally, it is now easy to see why *may* in 3 is not a polite form: in fact, its use makes two assumptions, both of which are counter to the conventions of politeness: (a) that the person who is able to grant permission (by the use of *may*) is superior to the person seeking it; (b) that the person seeking permission not only is not averse to doing the act indicated, but wishes to do it. Then the further assumption is that, as far as the person receiving permission by sentence 3 is concerned, having the cake is a good thing. As with *should*, this is counter to the usage of politeness.

These examples show several things. First, there are uses of the modals that reflect politeness, in terms of relative status of speaker and hearer, and implicit desirability of the act in question. In this respect these modal uses are parallel to the use of honorifics in other languages. Second, in order to tell how a modal is being used, and whether certain responses to it are (linguistically) appropriate, one must be aware of many extralinguistic, social factors. Just as, in speaking other languages, one must be aware of the social status of the other participants in a conversation in order to carry on the conversation acceptably, so one must at least some of the time in English, a language usually said not to require overt distinctions of this sort.

There are many other examples of politeness conventions explicitly realized in English. One is the use of imperatives, a task fraught with perils for one who does not understand the application of levels of politeness in English. For example, consider the following ways of giving an order. When can each be used appropriately? What happens if the wrong one is used?

(13) Come in, won't you?
(14) Please come in.
(15) Come in.
(16) Come in, will you?
(17) Get the hell in here.

It would seem clear that these sentences are ranked in an order of descending politeness. To use 17, your status must be higher than that of the addressee; moreover, you must be in such a situation that you don't even care to maintain the conventional pretense that you are addressing him as an equal. That is, 17 deliberately ASSERTS the superiority of the speaker over the addressee, and as such is rude in a situation in which it is not normal to make this assertion.[5] By

occur without *o-* when the speaker's own house is being referred to. The same informant points out an interesting difference in polite usage between Japanese and English, also relevant at this point: I have noted above that in English the modal *must*, ordinarily not a polite form, may be interpreted as polite in specific social contexts where one is able to 'ignore' certain aspects of the meaning of *must*. But in Japanese, this is not the case: I cannot use the word-for-word equivalent of 'You must have some cake' as a polite utterance equivalent to its English translation. It would, in fact, be interpreted as rude under the circumstances. One must rather say something like, 'Please have some cake as a favor to me.' Thus it is not necessarily true that one can 'ignore' the same aspects of meaning in two languages.

[5] This claim ignores the 'jovial' use of sentences like 17 as used between close friends, almost invariably male. Other examples are: *Get your ass in here, Harry! The party's started!*

contrast, 15 merely implies this assumption of superiority: it assumes compliance, and hence suggests that the speaker has the right to expect this compliance, and that the speaker therefore outranks the addressee; but it does these things much more covertly than 17. But, though not normally a rude form, it is still not really a polite one. Again, however, we must make an exception for one case, analogous to the one made in the first set of cases with modals: if the addressee is at the speaker's door and is a friend, 15 is much more normal than 13–14 as an invitation to enter. The first two, in fact, do not seem polite in this context: they give the impression of forced hospitality. Here again we seem to be depending on a more complex notion of politeness: both 13 and 14, like 2, imply that the addressee has the choice of complying or not—that his status is sufficiently high with respect to the speaker that he can obey or not as he sees fit—while 15, like 1, seems at first to suggest that the addressee has no choice, that his status is so low that he is obliged to obey. Yet both are relatively polite in this sort of social context. The reason in the case of 16 is parallel to that in 1: the speaker is implying here (by convention: he doesn't REALLY make this assumption, of course; it would be bizarre if he did) that the addressee doesn't really want to come in, that he will enter only under duress. Since 13–14 do not allow this assumption, they are less polite. So again the two definitions of politeness—status vs. desirability of the speaker's offering—are at odds, and again the latter seems stronger. When the speaker is not really offering something of his own, the status assumption becomes paramount, and 13–14 become more polite than 15. This is the case in a doctor's office, for example, where the receptionist is more likely to use 13–14. Again, 13–14 are likely to be used for 'forced' politeness—e.g., when inviting an encyclopedia salesman in, under duress. I am not sure why this is so. But it is also true that a superior may address an obvious inferior (for example, in the army) by 15, with no sense of sarcasm, i.e. no sense that he is being inappropriately polite. But if an officer addresses a private with 13, he is necessarily being sarcastic. There is no possibility of sarcasm, however, in the use of humbling forms of politeness, such as are found in 1 and 15. This is reminiscent of a fact that has been known for some time about presupposition in general: a first-order presupposition may be negated or questioned, under some conditions; a second-

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and *What makes you think you can go by my house without coming in, you asshole?* It seems that, between close male friends in some American subcultures at any rate, the purpose of such otherwise unpardonably rude exclamations is to say, 'We're on such good terms that we don't have to go by the rules.' This linguistic impropriety occurs in relationships of the same degree of closeness as those which allow their members, for example, to invite themselves over to each other's houses—otherwise a non-linguistic breach of propriety of similar magnitude. This illustrates again the parallelism of linguistic and non-linguistic concepts of politeness. These examples show, incidentally, that English, like Japanese, makes sex distinctions in the types of sentences possible. While a woman in most American subcultures would never use the above sentences, she might use the following to much the same effect, but lacking the obscenities: *Go ahead, have some more cake, Ethel—you're so fat, who'll notice if you get fatter?* Between very close friends, such a remark might be taken as an acceptable joke, but under any other conditions it is an unpardonable insult. There are other expressions confined to the feminine vocabulary: in particular epithets like 'gracious!' or 'dear, dear'. So English is again not so very unlike Japanese, except that the speaker of English can refrain from these usages altogether, but the speaker of Japanese must make his (or her) sex explicit in most conversations.

order presupposition cannot be. This suggests that the type of politeness involved in a usage like 15 or 1 is more complex in derivation than is the simple status-equalizing case in 13 or 2. In fact, it is probably true that the humbling type allows the status type to be deduced from it (if what I have is no good, one can deduce that I don't outrank you, in this respect anyway), so that the humbling type of politeness is one level deeper than the status type.

There are other assumptions, made in normal conversation, that are not tied to concepts of politeness. These, too, show up in non-obvious ways in the superficial structure. Some types which have been discussed by Grice 1968, as well as by Gordon & Lakoff, are rules of conversation. In a normal conversation, the participants will make the following assumptions, among others, about the discourse:[6]

Rule I. What is being communicated is true.

Rule II. It is necessary to state what is being said: it is not known to other participants, or utterly obvious. Further, everything necessary for the hearer to understand the communication is present.

Rule III. Therefore, in the case of statements, the speaker assumes that the hearer will believe what he says (due to Rule I).

Rule IV. With questions, the speaker assumes that he will get a reply.

Rule V. With orders, he assumes that the command will be obeyed.

All these assume, in addition, that the status of speaker and hearer is appropriate with respect to each other. (Of course, there are special situations in which all these are violated: lies, 'small talk', tall stories, riddles of certain types, and requests as opposed to commands. But in general these conditions define an appropriate conversational situation.)

But sometimes, even in ordinary conversational situations, some of these rules are violated. This is analogous to violating a rule of grammar: normally we should expect anomaly, lack of communication etc. When this is done baldly, e.g. by small children or by the insane, we do in fact notice that 'something is missing'; the conversation does not seem right. But in ordinary discourse among normal individuals we can often discern violations of these rules and others, and yet the total effect is not aberrant. One way in which apparent contradictions are reconciled is by the use of particles like *well*, *why*, *golly*, and *really*. Although these are often defined in pedagogical grammars as 'meaningless' elements, it

[6] These implicit rules show up overtly in certain locutions. Cf. the following:

John is a Communist, and if you don't $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{believe}\\ \text{*obey}\\ \text{*answer}\end{array}\right\}$ me, ask Fred.

Get out of here, and if you don't $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{*believe}\\ \text{obey}\\ \text{*answer}\end{array}\right\}$ me, I'll sock you.

I ask you whether John left, and if you don't $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{*believe}\\ \text{*obey}\\ \text{answer}\end{array}\right\}$ me, I'll be furious.

These examples show that, with each type of speech act—declaring, ordering, and asking—an 'appropriate' type of response is associated, and that this association shows up linguistically in superficial structures.

seems evident that they have real, specific meanings, and therefore can be inappropriately used. It is therefore within the sphere of linguistics to define their appropriate usage. Moreover, this appropriateness of usage seems at least sometimes to involve the notion of 'violation of a normal rule of conversation'. These particles serve as warnings to participants in the discourse that one or more of these rules is about to be, or has been, violated. When this warning is given, it is apparently legal to violate the rule—that is, of course, only the specific rule for which the warning was given. Otherwise confusion results.

I have shown elsewhere (Lakoff 1970b) that the English particles *well* and *why* function in this way. *Well* serves notice that something is left out of the utterance that the hearer would need in order to understand the sentence—something, normally, that he can supply, or that the speaker promises to supply himself shortly. That is, *well* marks a violation of the second part of Rule II. *Why* indicates that the speaker is surprised at what the addressee has said: it suggests that perhaps the prior speaker has violated Rule I, in the case of a statement, or II, in the case of a question. Other analogous cases in English involve special syntactic configurations rather than particles. Consider sentences like the following:

(18) Leave, won't you?
(19) Leave!
(20) John left, didn't he?
(21) John left.

In the even-numbered examples above, we have tag-forms, one for a command—as discussed earlier—and one for a statement. It is worth asking whether these superficially similar structures have any deeper similarity: whether the reasons for applying tag-formation to imperatives are related to the reasons for applying this rule to declarative statements. It is more or less traditional in transformational literature to suggest that the two types of tags have little in common aside from superficial similarities of formation. But there are reasons for supposing that, in fact, there are real semantic reasons for this apparent superficial coincidence. This is a rather satisfying hypothesis, if it can be substantiated: it would suggest that these two bizarre and highly English-specific formations have a common function, so that two mysteries may be reduced to one.

With reference to Rules III and V above, one way in which a tag question like 20 is distinguished from an ordinary statement like 21 is that the speaker really is asking less of the hearer. A speaker can demand belief from someone else only on condition that he himself fully believes the claim he is making. But the function of the tag is to suggest that the speaker, rather than demanding agreement or acquiescence from the hearer (as is true in a normal statement), is merely asking for agreement, leaving open the possibility that he won't get it. So a tag-question is really intermediate between a statement and a question: a statement assumes that the addressee will agree, and a question leaves the response of the addressee up to him, but a tag-question implies that, while the speaker expects a certain sort of response, the hearer may not provide it.[7] Hence its statement-

[7] As is well known, English has at least two intonation patterns associated with tag-statements (or, as they are more commonly called, tag-questions). One, rising, is closer to a

plus-question superficial form is quite logical. The effect of the tag, then, is to soften the declaration from an expression of certainty, demanding belief, to an expression of likelihood, merely requesting it—suggesting that Rule III may be ignored.[8]

How do these facts lead to the conclusion that tag-questions and imperatives function in a parallel fashion, and that this function involves the weakening or ignoring of normal rules of conversation? It is clear how 20 operates in this way, as a 'softened' version of 21. We already know that Rule V says that an order normally is given only if the giver can assume it will be followed; and this is true of an order like 19, as well as one like 15. But it is not true of the corresponding tag-imperatives 13 and 18. These sentences allow the addressee the option of obeying or not, as tag-statements like 20 allow the addressee the option of believing (or agreeing) or not. So both tag-types have the same function: to give the addressee an escape from what is normally an ironclad rule. As noted above, the particles *well* and *why*, appended to English sentences, have a similar effect: that of showing that certain of the rules of conversation are about to be violated. Then English has at least two means for indicating this relaxation of rules: the presence of particles, and the use of special transformational rules for this semantic purpose and no other—in this case, of course, tag-formation. It is not known

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question, as is predictable from the intonation pattern; this expresses less certainty on the speaker's part, and less hope of acquiescence by the addressee. The other, falling, is nearer to a statement, expressing near-certainty, with just the merest possibility left open that the addressee will fail to agree. The second type is often found as a kind of gesture of conventional politeness, meaning something like, 'I have enough information to know I'm right, but I'm just letting you have your say, in order to be polite.' It is interesting that some verbs of thinking, in the 1sg. present, have the same ambiguity resolved by the same difference in intonation pattern, and both types of locutions are used for similar purposes (cf. fn. 8 below). There is a third type of tag-question, used when the speaker definitely knows something is true, based on personal observation, and merely wishes to elicit a response from the addressee. This has the particle *sure* inserted, as in *It sure is cold in Ann Arbor, isn't it?*, vs. *It's cold in Ann Arbor, isn't it?* The latter sentence might be used if the speaker had merely read reports that the average temperature in Ann Arbor was 19°. He could not, under these conditions and if he had never been in Ann Arbor, use the former sentence. In Japanese, according to Uyeno (MS), the particle *ne* expresses both the senses of the second sentence, while its longer form *nee* corresponds to the first sentence.

[8] In fn. 7 I alluded briefly to the uses of verbs of thinking. My point is that verbs such as *guess*, *suppose*, *believe*, and sometimes *think*, when used in the 1sg. present, do not describe acts of cogitation: rather, they are means of softening a declarative statement. Consider the following sentences:

(a) I say that Fritz is a Zoroastrian.
(b) Fritz is a Zoroastrian.
(c) I guess Fritz is a Zoroastrian.
(d) Fritz is a Zoroastrian, isn't he?

If sentences like (a) and (b) (cf. Ross 1970) express certainty on the part of the speaker through the (overt or covert) performative verb of declaration, then (c) expresses the speaker's feeling that the event described in the complement of the verb of thinking is a probability rather than a certainty. As (b) corresponds to (a), it is my contention (made for other reasons in Lakoff 1969) that (d) corresponds to (c): in fact, they are closely synonymous in many of their uses, just like (a) and (b). As pointed out in fn. 7, the same disambiguation by intonation exists for both.

at present whether there are languages that are held to only one option or the other; what is known is that very few languages other than English (actually, none I have ever heard of) utilize such tag-formation rules. Then it should not be strange to find a language expressing analogous functions by the use of particles. A particularly interesting example is Japanese.

As with *well* and *why* in English, the use of any of the numerous particles in Japanese is governed by the extralinguistic context: the status of the participants (involving, among other relevant information, their sexes), the formality of the situation, and so on. Among them is a pair of particles (*ne* and *yo*) whose function apparently is to indicate interference with the normal rules of conversation. In fact, the only way in which one can find a generalization about the uses of these particles is to look at them in this way.[9]

Both *ne* and *yo* may be appended to any of the three sentence-types: declarative, interrogative, and imperative. When analysed superficially, the effect of each seems different for each different sentence-type; but when we bear in mind the issues dealt with above, certain generalizations fall into place. Let us look at some examples: for the convenience of readers who, like myself, are not fluent in Japanese, I have attempted to give symbolic rather than real Japanese examples: I have used English sentences of the appropriate types, with the Japanese particle added in its normal place at the right.

Ne may be appended to declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives:

(22) John is here *ne*. 'John is here, isn't he?' (a declarative, but without the normal declarative demand for the hearer's belief)

(23) Come here *ne*. 'Come here, won't you?' (an order, but without the normal imperative demand for the addressee's obedience)

(24) Is John here *ne*? 'I wonder if John is here ...?' (a question, but without the normal interrogative demand for the addressee's response)

In all three cases, as the interpretations indicate, a normally obligatory rule of conversation is relaxed: the particle *ne* is a signal to the addressee that he may choose to observe the implication (one of Rules III–V) or not, as he decides. The use of *ne* in Japanese (comparable to the use of tag-forms in two of the three English types) allows the ground-rules to be suspended, as it were.

As is true of most particles, the use of *ne* is not completely free. Its use is restricted to informal situations: conversation in small groups, and colloquial writing. (This is true of many English particles as well.) The reason for this seems to be that the use of these particles provides implicit personal information about the speaker—about his sex and status, relative to that of the addressee. On the other hand, part of the idea of 'formality' seems to lie in giving as little personal information as possible, confining the discourse solely to the information one wishes to convey. In formal social situations, for example, the speaker does not inquire about the health of the addressee (unless he is a doctor, in which case it is relevant to the discourse itself), while he typically does in less formal

[9] All examples here are from Uyeno, who discusses these cases, with many more examples, as well as other extremely interesting particle uses in Japanese, in her forthcoming dissertation. Kazuhiko Yoshida and Chisato Kitagawa provided enlightening discussion and further examples of these constructions.

dialog. When particles are used in formal prose, they are ones like *indeed*, which give implicit information about the relationship of the various elements in the discourse to one another, and do not involve the speaker's relationship toward the hearer or his feelings toward the information he is conveying.

Aside from this general condition on the use of particles, *ne* is also subject to other conditions, based on the social situation. The speaker must be aware of the relative status of himself and his addressee in order to know whether *ne* is usable in a discourse—i.e., to know whether he can offer his addressee the right to suspend the relevant rule. Again, this can be ascertained by looking at how the particle functions in discourse: roughly, it can be used in situations corresponding to those in which a speaker of English can ask, 'What do YOU think?' Three conditions determine when such locutions are acceptable:

(i) The status of the addressee should be somewhat higher than that of the speaker, since offering a choice is an act of deference. (This may be true even if the participants are in fact social equals, as a 'humbling' gesture of politeness on the part of the speaker.)

(ii) The status of the addressee cannot be very much higher than that of the speaker, since if it is, the speaker doesn't have the right to OFFER a choice.

(iii) The status of the addressee cannot be lower than that of the speaker, since then he would not have the right to MAKE a choice. So we see that both the function and the conditions on the use of *ne* are tied to assumptions made by speaker and hearer about the context—social and linguistic—in which the utterance takes place.

A similar situation can be shown to pertain in the case of *yo*, the other particle mentioned above, which may be appended to declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives:

(25) John is here *yo*. 'I tell you John is here, (and you'd better believe it).' (a declarative in which the speaker explicitly demands the addressee's observance of Rule III)

(26) Come here *yo*. 'I'm telling you to come here, (and you'd better obey).'[10] (an order in which the speaker explicitly demands the addressee's observance of Rule V)

(27) Is John here *yo*? 'What do you mean, is John here?' 'Are you asking me, "Is John here?" '

[10] Kazuhiko Yoshida points out that, though this sentence may be used by both men and women, the effect is different. The translation given here is the sense it would have when spoken by a man. If spoken by a woman, it would mean something like, 'I really hope you will come here. Please don't forget.' A strong command has been replaced by an earnest request. The effect of *yo* here in women's speech seems to be something like an attempt to express the idea that the speaker wishes she had the status to insist on the observance of Rule V. The use of *yo* by a speaker of much lower status than the addressee (which, in conventional Japanese society, presumably automatically includes all women) is in a sense contradictory for reasons to be discussed below. The contradiction is resolved by using *yo* to indicate a strong request, rather than a strong injunction that cannot be disobeyed. This is still another example of how non-linguistic context (such as the sex of participants in a discourse) affects the interpretation of sentences, and therefore must be considered part of the linguistic information available to a speaker.

This last is possible only as an incredulous echo-question based on a prior question of the addressee's, 'Is John here?' It is therefore a rhetorical question, expecting either a positive or negative answer. The effect is: 'How can you ask such a question, when it's so obvious what the answer must be?' The speaker, in effect, asks why the hearer wants to have Rule IV obeyed.

As is evident from the foregoing, the behavior of *yo* with questions is more complex and much harder to understand, in terms of our tentative generalization, than its use with either of the other two sentence-types. But we may make a start toward analysing it as follows. First, assume that the addressee of 27, A, was the speaker of the immediately preceding discourse—in this case the question, 'Is John here?'. Then, of course, A, in asking this normal question, is implicitly making the assumption that the addressee B, the potential speaker of 27, will follow Rule IV. B is of course aware that observance of Rule IV is expected of him, but the question is such that he cannot imagine why A asked the question—i.e., why A expects Rule IV to be followed. So what B is doing in effect, by using sentence 27, is to make Rule IV explicit by calling it into question. Sentence 27, then, means something like, 'I don't see why I have to answer this question, "Is John here?" '; or, perhaps, 'Make it explicit to me why I should be expected to reply.' Where the statement and the command make explicit the fact that they anticipate the ADDRESSEE's compliance with the rule, the question followed by *yo* comments on the fact that the SPEAKER of the *yo*-question himself has been expected to comply with a rule that he does not, in the present instance, see the reason for. For some speakers, a positive reply is what is obviously anticipated; for others, a negative one. It would not be surprising if some speakers might be able to use 27 in both cases. (Intonation will differ depending on which interpretation is intended.) There are several close parallels in English:

(28) A: Is Agnew a liberal?
B: *What do you mean,* Is Agnew a liberal?

(29) A: Is Ted smoking a reefer?
B: *Are you asking me whether* Ted is smoking a reefer?

In both these cases, depending on context, B's response may be construed as being equivalent to 'Of course!' or to 'Of course not!' But, as explained above, this diversity of interpretation is not contradictory, once it can be seen that both replies reflect the speaker's questioning the need for the act of interrogation, or, more precisely, the need for B to follow Rule IV. Then all three cases where the rule of conversation is insisted upon are realized superficially in Japanese by the use of *yo*, and in English by the explicit presence in the superficial structure of the performative verb, normally left implicit (cf. Ross 1970). Thus we see that, to express this notion of insistence on observance, English employs a variation of a transformational rule (i.e., a normally obligatory rule, performative deletion, is in this situation inapplicable), just as it employed a specific transformational rule, tag-question formation, to indicate the relaxation of the observance of the same rule of conversation. For both, Japanese employs particles. And we see again that, although the two languages differ greatly in the grammatical means by which they express this notion, both can express it relatively unambiguously. Further, the languages express the idea in syntactically parallel fashion for the three types of speech acts (though English does not with the equivalent of *ne*-questions). This shows again that we cannot stop our analysis at the point of superficial structure, or at the point of logical structure, in fact: we must ask in every case what the extralinguistic context of a sentence is, what purpose it is used for; only on that basis can we establish whether or not sentences in two languages are parallel. And it should be clear that a theory that does not allow the interrelationship of linguistic and extralinguistic context cannot tell us what is held in common by *yo* and *ne*; by *ne* and tag-questions; by *yo* and the overt presence of the performative; or, finally, by tag-questions and tag-imperatives on the one hand, and explicit declarative, imperative, and interrogative performatives on the other. This is a large chunk of linguistic material for a theory to ignore.

In Japanese, *yo* is apparently much more normal for male than for female speakers, and this is particularly true of *yo* with questions: all my informants, one of them female, agree that a woman would never or rarely use a sentence like 27. Given the conventional status of women in the Japanese culture, it is easy to see why a Japanese woman would never use *yo*. In its non-interrogative use, its purpose is to demand compliance from the addressee. To be able to do so, the speaker must outrank the hearer and must, in addition, be willing to make this relationship obvious. A Japanese woman would not be nearly as likely to do this as would a man. In interrogatives, not only does the speaker do this, but he also questions the right of the addressee (the speaker of the prior question) to expect the rule of conversation to be adhered to, which amounts to a still more overt declaration of higher status on the part of the speaker.

Why should one need to make a demand of this type explicit, when it normally is understood by the addressee anyway? One reason for the use of *yo* or its equivalent occurs when the speaker has some reason to fear that the rule in question may not in fact be obeyed by the addressee. Although one might expect the social situations in which *yo* is usable to be the reverse of those in which *ne* is possible, this is not quite true. We might, for instance, assume that the higher someone is in status, the more appropriate it might be to explicitly demand compliance to the rules. But if one is sufficiently superior, he has no reason at all to fear that his injunctions, explicit or implicit, will be disobeyed. Therefore, *yo* is most apt to be used where the speaker is somewhat superior to the hearer, so that he has the right to make demands, but not so much higher that he has no need to make them. Obviously, *yo* cannot be used by someone of lower social status than the addressee.[11]

[11] An apparent problem for this analysis (or, so far as I can see, any analysis) is the fact that *yo* and *ne* may occur in sentences like this:

(a) *Kore-wa anata-no hon da wa yo ne.*

(b) This is your book *yo ne.*

If *yo* demands compliance with the rules of conversation, and *ne* allows relaxation of the rules, is not such a sentence contradictory? As explained by Uyeno, however, the effect of such utterances is to express the speaker's insistence that the addressee acquiesce: i.e., it appears that *yo* modifies *ne*. Thus (a) has as its closest English equivalent a sentence like

(c) This IS your book, isn't it?

Having given evidence that English speakers are capable of making distinctions of the first two types alluded to at the beginning of this paper, let us now examine the third. What about the use of 'dubitatives' and their opposites, as endings on verbs or particles, to express uncertainty or certainty on the speaker's part? I have already given examples of 'dubitatives' in English: the use of *I guess* or of tags, as has been shown, is essentially dubitative in function; it is a sign that the speaker is not altogether prepared to stand by his assertion, in the sense that he does not have complete confidence in what he is asserting, since he does not—he cannot, as we have seen—demand the addressee's belief as he ordinarily would. The best he can do is to ask for it. As an example, if I say

(30) John is in Antarctica,

and it later turns out that 30 is not the case, my addressee may later say, 'You were wrong about 30.' If he does, I have no recourse but to agree, providing his evidence is incontestable. But if instead I say

(31) I guess John is in Antarctica

under the same conditions, and later the addressee says, 'You were wrong', then I have the option of replying, 'No, I only said I THOUGHT 30 might be the case.' That is, I can claim I was not really making that assertion. Thus verbs such as *guess* in the 1st person singular, like tags, function as subjunctives do in languages like Latin:

(32) *Marcus Publium interfecit quod uxorem suam corrupisset.*
(33) *Marcus Publium interfecit quod uxorem suam corrupit.*
'Marcus killed Publius because he seduced his wife.'

Here the presence of the subjunctive in 32 indicates that the speaker is not prepared to take responsibility for the claim that the alleged reason is in fact the real reason for an action. With the indicative, as in 33, the speaker implicitly takes responsibility. We have no natural means of expressing this difference in English: we must resort to paraphrase. But we do have analogous devices, illustrated by 31, usable under other grammatical conditions. If we were teaching

This is equivalent to something like, 'I guess this is your book—I certainly hope you'll agree.' Such a sentence might be used in circumstances like this: suppose that the speaker of (c) has previously borrowed the book in question from the addressee. The addressee has, throughout the transaction, behaved as though the book were his to lend. But now a third person accosts the speaker of (c), demanding the book back, as if it had always been his. The speaker of (c)—partly because he knows or likes the addressee better than the third person and therefore trusts him more, partly because it is to his advantage for the book to belong to the addressee—still feels fairly confident that the addressee really owns the book. But he is not as sure as formerly, and needs confirmation. His use of (c) is equivalent to saying, first, 'I say this is your book, and I hope you believe it' (i.e., 'This is your book *ne*.') Then he adds, 'I REALLY hope you can go along with this hypothesis; you'd better (for my sake) agree to this'—where *yo* modifies and strengthens the hope of the speaker that the addressee will be able to acquiesce: i.e., 'I'm giving you a chance to relax Rule III, but I hope you don't take it.'

I am not sure that this is precisely correct; but in any event the effect is not contradictory, and it does seem as though *yo* modifies *ne* rather than the utterance itself, particularly as an utterance like (a) is more apt to be used by women than is a normal *yo*-sentence.

English to a speaker of Latin, we might want to exemplify this use of *guess* (which I do not believe is found in Latin in this sense) by suggesting parallels with sentences like 32, rather than by resorting to elaborate circumlocutions, which, as we have seen, don't really give the same idea.

English has other devices to express the speaker's acceptance or denial of responsibility for something in an utterance. Like the honorifics discussed earlier, these are not generally recognized as dubitatives or 'certaintives' (if I may coin that term), because they are not characteristically obligatory morphemes, and because they function in only a limited subset of sentence-types. It is not surprising, in view of our earlier findings, to see that modals perform these functions along with many others. With verbs of perception, the modal *can* displays certain semantic properties not derivable from any normal definition of *can*. As first noted by Boyd & Thorne 1969, under certain conditions sentences containing *can* appear to be synonymous to sentences without it:

(34) I can understand French perfectly.
(35) I understand French perfectly.

But in some contexts where this should be true, particularly when the verb is non-1st-person present, we find that although the denotative content of the sentence pairs remains the same, one member often contains implications that are lacking in the other; e.g.,

(36) That acid-head John hears voices telling him he is Spiro Agnew, so don't play golf with him.
(37) That acid-head John can hear voices telling him he is Spiro Agnew, so don't play golf with him.

In order for 37 to be acceptable, the speaker would have to be making the assumption that the voices were real, rather than hallucinations. Then the effect of *can* in sentences such as these (again, a very restricted subset) is to indicate doubt in the speaker's mind as to the reality of what he is describing—the effect of dubitative morphemes in many languages.

With these two sentences, contrast a situation in which the speaker might normally agree that the phenomena were real which the subject of the sentence was sensing. Then the presence of *can* is at least as normal as its absence:

(38) Mrs. Snickfritz has eyes like a hawk: she can spot dust on your carpet even if you just vacuumed.
(39) Mrs. Snickfritz has eyes like a hawk: she spots dust on your carpet even if you just vacuumed.

There is a distinction in meaning between these two sentences, but it is not the same as the one found in the first pair: in these, in which the first part of the sentence establishes the reality of the dust Mrs. Snickfritz sees, the sentence with *can* seems to be used merely as evidence of her superlative ability, while the sentence without *can* is less an expression of approval or astonishment than a suggestion that Mrs. Snickfritz, because of her punctiliousness, is a pain in the neck.

Elsewhere in the modal system we find a device for expressing the opposite of the dubitative, namely the speaker's certainty that an event will take place. This phenomenon has been referred to as '*will*-deletion', though perhaps, as I have argued elsewhere (Lakoff 1970a), a better name is '*will*-insertion'. In any case, in sentences referring to future events, the absence of *will* indicates that the speaker has reason to be sure that the event will occur, whether because it is scheduled or because he has control over it. (Many things about this phenomenon are still unclear; there are numerous puzzling cases and apparent counter-examples to the generalization just given, but we can assume it is an accurate enough generalization to be used in the present discussion.) In the previous example, the presence of the modal *can* acted as a dubitative marker; here, it is the absence of *will* that acts as a certaintive. Alternatively, we might view the presence of *will* as a dubitative, making the speaker appear less certain about the occurrence of an event in the future than he might be. Whichever way one looks at it, the facts are relatively clear, as in

(40) John dies at dawn.

(41) John will die at dawn.

In 40, the executioner is speaking; he controls John's destiny, and has himself arranged for John's death. In 41, although the executioner could say this sentence, it might also be John's doctor speaking—though he could not say 40, even if he were familiar with the course of John's disease and could be fairly sure when death would occur. He does not (presumably) have a hand in it. However these facts are to be interpreted, I think the use of the modals in sentences 36–41 can be viewed as parallel to that of dubitatives and similar forms in other languages.

Finally, there are still other related facts involving modals and their paraphrases, noted by Larkin 1969. He points out that there is, for many speakers at least, a difference in the appropriate conditions under which these sentences can be used:

(42) My girl must be home by midnight.

(43) My girl has to be home by midnight.

By using 42, the speaker takes responsibility for the obligation. But 43 is neutral; he may merely be reporting an obligation he does not necessarily approve of. Compare:

(44) * My girl must be home by midnight—I think it's idiotic.

(45) My girl has to be home by midnight—I think it's idiotic.

In this case, the speaker is not taking or refusing responsibility for the FACTUAL content of the sentence, as he was in the other cases. Here the truth of the modal notion itself is at issue—whether there really is a true 'obligation' involved. I am not sure whether dubitatives in other languages can affect or cast doubt on modality, as these can.

There are examples parallel to Larkin's with other modals; this is not an isolated fact about *must/have to*, as the previous examples were isolated cases with *can* or *will*. This fact suggests a pervasive property throughout the modal system. The existence in English of periphrastic modal forms may not be due wholly to the fact that modals are syntactically defective; there is a real need for the periphrastic forms at a semantic level as well. Compare the following:

(46) John will shoot the basilisk.

(47) John is to shoot the basilisk.
(48) Bill may have a cookie.
(49) Bill is allowed to have a cookie.

In the first set, *will* is the root sense *will* of command: 'I order that ...' Thus 46 is a direct order, for which the speaker is assuming responsibility. In 47, he is still transmitting an order, but it may have originated with someone else; it may not be an order he goes along with. For most speakers of American English, 48 expresses the direct giving of permission by the speaker. But 49 may be used to report someone else's giving of permission. Thus, *will/be to* and *may/be allowed to* are parallel to *must/have to.*

I have, then, given examples of phenomena in English and other languages that bear out certain contentions:

(a) Honorifics, particles relating speaker and discourse, and dubitatives (with their relatives) are not confined to those exotic languages that have special exclusive markers for them. They are found in English; but the forms used to indicate their presence are used in other ways in other sentence types, so that they are not readily identifiable. This indicates that languages have many and arcane ways of expressing concepts; we should not assume a language cannot make a distinction just because it has no exclusive form by which to make it.

(b) In order to assign the correct distributions to the forms under discussion, it is essential to take extralinguistic contextual factors into account: respective status of speaker and addressee, the type of social situation in which they find themselves, the real-world knowledge or beliefs a speaker brings to a discourse, his lack of desire to commit himself on a position, etc. We cannot hope to describe or explain large segments of any given language by recourse only to factors which play a role in the superficial syntax: we must take account of other levels of language, which traditional transformational grammar expressly prevents us from doing.[12]

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[12] As should be apparent to anyone familiar with other than purely transformational linguistic tradition, the notion that contextual factors, social and otherwise, must be taken into account in determining the acceptability and interpretation of sentences is scarcely new. It has been anticipated by a veritable *Who's who* of linguistics and anthropology: Jespersen, Sapir, Malinowski, Firth, Nida, Pike, Hymes, Friedrich, Tyler, and many others. But the idea has not merely been forgotten by transformational grammar; rather, it has been explicitly rejected. Therefore, to bring up facts such as these within the framework of recent linguistic discussion is to do more than merely restate an old platitude. I hope that by discussing new facts, and expatiating on their theoretical implications, I have shown that contextual factors cannot be avoided by the linguist of any theoretical view, if he is to deal honestly and accurately with the facts of language.

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